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Abstract 
We argue that normative indices of multidimensional inequality do not only measure a distribution’s 
extent of inequity (i.e., the gaps between the better-off and the worse-off), but also its extent of 
inefficiency (i.e., the non-realized mutually beneficial exchanges of goods). We provide a 
decomposition that allows quantifying these two parts of inequality. Exact formulas of the inequity and 
inefficiency components are provided for a generic class of social welfare functions. The inequity 
component turns out to be a two-stage measure, which applies a unidimensional inequality measure to 
the vector of well-being levels. We critically discuss two prominent transfer principles, viz., uniform 
majorization and correlation increasing majorization, in the light of the decomposition. A 
decomposition of inequality in human development illustrates the analysis. 
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1 Introduction
The normative approach to inequality measurement focuses on the social
welfare gain that could be obtained by optimally redistributing the avail-
able goods. The greater is this potential welfare gain, the greater is in-
equality.1 If there is only one good, as in the case of income inequality, then
the only way the ethical observer can increase welfare is by redistributing
from better off to worse off individuals, i.e., by improving equity. Hence, in
the unidimensional setting, inequality as defined in the normative approach
coincides with inequity.
The identity of inequality and inequity vanishes once we move to the
multidimensional setting. In addition to equity improvements, now also
efficiency improvements become possible: by exchanging goods between in-
dividuals with unequal marginal rates of substitution, the ethical observer
can increase the well-being levels of all individuals involved. Because nor-
mative indices of multidimensional inequality measure the total potential
welfare gain, they capture both inequity and inefficiency. It immediately
follows that the use of the terms inequality and inequity as synonyms is
misleading in the multidimensional setting.
A simple example, with two individuals and two goods, will illustrate
the importance of distinguishing between inequity and inefficiency in mul-
tidimensional inequality judgments. For the example, we will assume that
social welfare is measured using two symmetric Cobb-Douglas functions,
one to aggregate individual bundles of goods into well-being levels and one
to aggregate individual well-being levels into social welfare.2 The assump-
tion of a common individual well-being function is of course restricting.
Nevertheless, we will adopt it throughout the paper because it is a stan-
dard, though often implicit assumption in the literature under examina-
tion.3
Consider the left-hand panel of Figure 1. Depicted is distribution X =
(x1, x2), where x1 = (70, 10) is the bundle of individual 1 and x2 = (10, 70)
is the bundle of individual 2. Also depicted is distribution Y = (y1, y2),
where y1 = y2 = (40, 40), the welfare maximizing distribution given the
1The normative approach was pioneered in the unidimensional setting by Dalton
(1920), Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973). In the multidimensional setting,
the approach was first suggested by Kolm (1977) and further developed by Tsui (1995).
See Weymark (2006) for a survey.
2This specification is obtained by setting α = 1, β = 1 and r1 = r2 in equations (5)
and (6) below.
3An exception is the study by Decancq, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2012), which
incorporates heterogenous preferences into a multidimensional poverty measure.
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Figure 1. Distribution X exhibits inefficiency but is perfectly equitable (left),
while distribution X ′ exhibits inequity but is perfectly efficient (right)
available goods in X . In distribution X , the two individuals have equal
well-being levels as measured by the symmetric Cobb-Douglas function,
and hence X is perfectly equitable. The entire welfare gain in moving to
the ideal distribution Y is due to efficiency improving exchanges of goods
between the individuals. Consider now the right-hand panel, which depicts
distribution X ′ = (x′
1
, x′
2
), where x′
1
= (20, 20) and x′
2
= (60, 60). In
distribution X ′, there are no possibilities for efficiency improving exchanges
of goods, and hence X ′ is perfectly efficient.4 Now the entire welfare gain
in moving to the ideal distribution Y is due to equity improving transfers
of goods from the better off individual 2 to the worse off individual 1.
The example shows that the sources of potential welfare gain, and hence
the meaning of inequality in the normative approach, can differ dramati-
cally depending on the distribution under consideration. Indeed, inequality
coincides with inefficiency in the case of distribution X , while it coincides
with inequity in the case of distribution X ′. Incidentally, the inequality
values computed using the assumed double-Cobb-Douglas social welfare
specification are 0.34 for X and 0.13 for X ′.5 This illustrates that it is
highly misleading to identify inequality with inequity in the normative ap-
proach: although measured inequality is greater in X than in X ′, inequity
is smaller in X than in X ′.
Distributions typically exhibit both inequity and inefficiency. A full un-
4Indeed, the marginal rates of substitution of the two individuals are equal.
5The inequality measure used is 1−f , where f is obtained by substituting equations
(5) and (6) into equation (2) and setting α = 1, β = 1 and r1 = r2.
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derstanding of multidimensional inequality therefore requires distinguish-
ing and quantifying these two underlying aspects. Using a suggestion by
Graaff (1977), we show that normative indices of multidimensional inequal-
ity can be neatly decomposed into an inequity and an inefficiency part. We
provide an exact formula for each of the two components for a generic class
of social welfare functions. This generic class includes the popular double-
ces class, which in turn includes the double-Cobb-Douglas social welfare
function used in the example above.
One striking conclusion of our analysis is that the inequity component
associated with a normative inequality measure is a so-called two-stage
measure, as proposed by Maasoumi (1986). Such a measure applies a
unidimensional inequality measure to the vector of individual well-being
levels. The two-stage approach has been regarded as both intrinsically
different from the normative approach and conceptually less appealing
(Bourguignon, 1999, and Weymark, 2006). But the analysis shows that
the two-stage approach receives a solid theroretical justification as a mea-
sure of multidimensional inequity from within the normative approach.
We use the decomposition to assess two prominent multidimensional
transfer principles, viz., uniform majorization and correlation increasing
majorization, both of which have received criticism in the literature. First,
Dardanoni (1995) has argued that uniform majorization in some cases
propagates transfers that increase the gaps between individual well-being
levels. Our decomposition shows that the transfers in such cases indeed
worsen equity, but that they improve efficiency, so that uniform majoriza-
tion can be seen as demanding that the latter effect outweighs the former
effect. Second, Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) have argued that
correlation increasing majorization is inappropriate if the goods are com-
plements rather than substitutes. Our decomposition suggests that this
point may be stated too harshly. Given complementarity, the transfers
propagated by the principle indeed cause an efficiency loss. But because
there is also an equity improvement, the principle can be understood as
demanding tolerance of this efficiency leak in return for the improvement
in equity.
Finally, we illustrate the proposed decomposition with an empirical ap-
plication to population-weighted between-country inequality in the period
1980 to 2011. We focus on the three well-being dimensions of the popular
Human Development Index: living standards, health and education. We
show that multidimensional inequality has decreased during the period and
that this result is driven by decreases in both inequity and inefficiency.
The next section introduces notation and basic assumptions. Section
4
3 presents the decomposition of multidimensional inequality into inequity
and inefficiency parts. In Section 4, uniform majorization and correlation
increasing majorization are critically discussed in the light of the decom-
position. Section 5 provides the illustrative empirical analysis. Section 6
concludes.
2 Notation and assumptions
There are n individuals and m goods. The quantity of good k owned by
individual i is a positive real number xik. The bundle of individual i is a
vector xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xim). A distribution is an n ×m matrix X with
bundle xi at the ith row. The set of all bundles is B and the set of all
distributions is D. We use µX to denote the bundle (µ1, µ2, . . . , µm) with
µk = (x1k+x2k+· · ·+xnk)/n the average quantity of good k in distribution
X . We use Xµ to denote the distribution in which each individual has a
bundle equal to µX . We write 1ℓ for the ℓ-vector with a one at each entry.
A social welfare function is a function W : D → R. The value W (X)
is to be interpreted as the social welfare level associated with distribution
X in D. We focus on the class of social welfare functions W. A social
welfare function W is inW if and only if there exist a continuous, concave,
linearly homogenous6 and strictly increasing function u : B → R with
u(1m) = 1 and a continuous, Schur-concave,
7 linearly homogenous and
strictly increasing function v : Rn → R with v(1n) = 1 such that, for each
distribution X in D, we have
W (X) = v(u(x1), u(x2), . . . , u(xn)). (1)
As we prove in Appendix A, the class W is characterized by the fol-
lowing seven properties: (i) anonymity (welfare is invariant to rearranging
bundles of individuals), (ii) monotonicity (increasing the amount of a good
owned by an individual increases welfare), (iii) continuity (small changes
in distributions do not cause large changes in their welfare ranking), (iv)
weak uniform majorization (progressive transfers uniformly applied to each
good do not decrease welfare), (v) normalization (if each individual has an
amount λ of each good, then the social welfare level is λ), (vi) individ-
ualism (welfare is measured in two steps, a first step to aggregate across
6A function ψ : Rℓ → R is linearly homogenous, or homogenous of degree one, if
ψ(λs) = λψ(s) for each s in Rℓ and each positive real number λ.
7A function ψ : Rℓ → R is Schur-concave if ψ(s) ≤ ψ(Qs) for each s in Rℓ and
each bistochastic matrix Q. A bistochastic matrix is a nonnegative square matrix of
which each row sum and each column sum is equal to 1. A permutation matrix is a
bistochastic matrix of which each component is either 0 or 1.
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dimensions for each individual, and a second step to aggregate the obtained
values across individuals) and (vii) homotheticity (the welfare ranking of
two distributions is preserved if each good of each individual is multiplied
by the same factor in both distributions). These seven properties are stan-
dard in the literature.8 Nevertheless, the use of weak uniform majorization
is not without controversy, an issue to which we return in detail in Section
4.
We will interpret the function u in equation (1) as a well-being measure
common to all individuals. This interpretation is in line with the litera-
ture. Some studies explicitly treat u (or a similar function) as a measure
of individual well-being and discuss it using the language of utility theory
(e.g., Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982, Atkinson, 2003, and Bourguignon
and Chakravarty, 2003). Other studies are less explicit, but admit the
possibility of this interpretation. For example, Tsui (1995, p. 264) notes
that properties such as (i) to (vii) above do not only impose requirements
on a social welfare function, but also on an underlying concept of individ-
ual well-being.9 Hence, these properties can be interpreted as describing
an ethical observer’s value judgments concerning individual well-being, a
possible interpretation already noted by Kolm (1977, pp. 2-3).
Two final comments are in order. First, the function u is a least concave
representation of the common individual well-being ranking (see Proposi-
tion 1 in Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1981).10 Therefore, the social welfare
function in equation (1) is in a form that allows a clear separation be-
tween, on the one hand, the ordinal properties of the individual well-being
ranking, such as the degree of complementarity of the goods and, on the
other hand, the cardinal properties of the social aggregation, such as the
8With the exception of normalization and individualism, all these properties are
discussed in the survey by Weymark (2006). Normalization is an innocent property
that ensures a convenient cardinalization of the social welfare function. Individualism
is very common in the literature: some studies explicitly impose individualism (e.g.,
Kolm, 1977, and Seth, 2011), while others assume stronger requirements of additive
separability that imply individualism (e.g., Tsui, 1995). A noteworthy exception is the
study by Gajdos and Weymark (2005). Gajdos and Weymark propose a social welfare
function that is not individualistic, but rather first aggregates across individuals for
each dimension, and second aggregates the obtained values across dimensions. Their
approach can be seen as an attempt to make the best of a situation in which no data
on the joint distribution of the dimensions are available.
9For example, anonymity makes the individual well-being measure common to all
individuals, monotonicity makes it increasing in the amounts of goods, and weak uniform
majorization makes it quasi-concave.
10A function v is a least concave representation of a well-being relation if, for each
concave representation v∗ of the same well-being relation, we have v∗ = ψ ◦ v, where ψ
is a concave and increasing function (Debreu, 1976).
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degree of inequity aversion. With the cardinal representation of the indi-
vidual well-being ranking fixed, the former category of properties is in u,
whereas the latter category is in v. This form was advocated by Atkinson
and Bourguignon (1982, p. 191).
Second, the valueW (X) in equation (1) is the equally distributed equiv-
alent level of individual well-being associated with X . That is, W (X) is
the level of individual well-being that, if equally attained by all individu-
als, yields the same level of welfare as X . The function W inherits linear
homogeneity from the function u.
3 Equity and efficiency as components of equality
3.1 Measuring inequality
The normative approach to inequality measurement identifies inequality
with the potential welfare gain that could be obtained by distributing the
available goods optimally. In order to avoid that the values of the inequal-
ity measure depend on an arbitrary choice of cardinalization of the social
welfare function, the literature has opted to measure this potential wel-
fare gain in terms of goods rather than directly in terms of welfare. Kolm
(1977, footnote 3) and Tsui (1995) proposed what is now the standard
procedure to derive a relative multidimensional inequality measure from a
social welfare function in W. A relative inequality measure is invariant to
a multiplication of each good of each individual by the same factor. Ap-
pendix B provides the analogous analysis for absolute inequality measures
(which are invariant to an addition of the same amount to each good of
each individual).
The Kolm-Tsui procedure is as follows: equality in distribution X is
measured by the smallest fraction of the total good amounts in X required
to maintain the level of welfare of X .
Definition 1. Let X be a distribution in D. Let f(X) be the smallest real
number for which there exists a distribution Y in D such that W (Y ) =
W (X) and µY = f(X)×µX . Then, f(X) is the equality level and 1−f(X)
is the inequality level of distribution X .
Because a social welfare function W in W satisfies weak uniform ma-
jorization, the available goods in X are optimally distributed if each indi-
vidual is given the average bundle µX . Hence, equality f(X) is defined by
W (X) = W (f(X)Xµ). Since W is linearly homogenous, we have
f(X) =
W (X)
W (Xµ)
. (2)
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The relative inequality measure 1 − f is standard in the literature.11 The
inequality level 1−f(X) is the percentage welfare loss incurred by moving
from the optimal distribution Xµ to the actual distribution X .
The example in the introduction revealed that the potential welfare gain
measured by 1− f reflects both efficiency and equity improvements. This
makes the meaning and interpretation of variations in inequality ambigu-
ous, thus calling for a decomposition of equality into efficiency and equity
parts. Not only will such a decomposition illuminate existing controver-
sies surrounding the theoretical foundations of multidimensional inequality
measurement (see Section 4), it will also be a useful tool in empirical re-
search (see Section 5).
3.2 A decomposition
To decompose equality into efficiency and equity parts, we use a procedure
suggested by Graaff (1977).12 Graaff’s procedure distinguishes two steps
involved in the welfare optimization underlying Definition 1. The first step
consists of efficiency improving exchanges of goods, which increase the well-
being levels of all involved individuals. The second step consists of equity
improving redistributions of goods, which decrease the individual well-
being gaps. Graaff proposes an efficiency measure and an equity measure
corresponding, respectively, to each of these two steps.
The efficiency measure is closely related to Debreu’s (1951) coefficient
of resource utilization: efficiency in distribution X is measured by the
smallest fraction of the total good amounts in X required to maintain the
individual well-being levels associated with X .
Definition 2. Let X be a distribution in D. Let d(X) be the smallest real
number for which there exists a distribution Z in D such that u(zi) = u(xi)
for each individual i and µZ = d(X) × µX . Then, d(X) is the efficiency
level and 1− d(X) is the inefficiency level of distribution X .
Distribution Z in Definition 2 is perfectly efficient, but it maintains the
level of inequity of distribution X because all individual well-being levels
are the same in the two distributions. Therefore, the level of equity of
distribution X can be measured by applying Definition 1 to distribution
11The linear homogeneity of W indeed ensures that 1 − f is relative, i.e., we have
1− f(X) = 1− f(λX) for each distribution X in D and each positive real number λ.
12Graaff (1977) did not apply his procedure to multidimensional inequality measure-
ment. Graaff was instead interested in establishing the conditions under which aggregate
income growth leads to an improvement in efficiency.
8
Z: equity in distribution X is the smallest fraction of the good amounts
in distribution Z required to maintain the level of welfare of Z.
Definition 3. Let X be a distribution in D. Let Z be a distribution
in D obtained from distribution X as in Definition 2. Let e(X) be the
smallest real number for which there exists a distribution T such that
W (T ) = W (Z) and µT = e(X) × µZ . Then, e(X) is the equity level and
1− e(X) is the inequity level of distribution X .
As in Graaff (1977), we obtain a multiplicative decomposition of equal-
ity into its efficiency and equity parts. To see this, first note that W (X) =
W (Z) because all well-being levels are equal in distributions X and in Z.
Hence, distribution T in Definition 3 must be equal to distribution Y in
Definition 1. Combining µY = e(X) × µZ and µZ = d(X)× µX , we have
µY = e(X)× d(X)× µX . Since also µY = f(X)× µX , we indeed obtain
f(X) = d(X) × e(X).
We will now derive formulas for the efficiency measure d and the equity
measure e. We start by constructing distribution Z in Definition 2 for a
given distribution X . Figure 2 gives an illustration for the two-individual
case. Because the individual well-being function u is homothetic, giving
each individual a proportion of the same bundle nµX results in an effi-
cient distribution.13 For each individual i, define si by u(xi) = u(sinµX).
That is, si is the share of the societal bundle nµX that individual i would
require in order to attain the level of well-being associated with bundle
xi. Hence, distribution Z equals (s1nµX , s2nµX , . . . , snnµX)
′. Efficiency
d(X) is computed by the relative distance between the actual societal bun-
dle nµX and the smaller bundle nµZ . Since nµZ =
∑n
i=1 sinµX , we have
d(X) =
∑n
i=1 si. Moreover, si = u(xi)/nu(µX) because u is linearly ho-
mogenous. We obtain
d(X) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 u(xi)
u(µX)
. (3)
Equation (3) has a straightforward interpretation. It reveals that the effi-
ciency measure d is in fact the equality measure f in equation (2) applied
to the inequity neutral version of the social welfare function W , i.e., the
social welfare function obtained by replacing in equation (1) the function
v by the mean operator.14
13To see this, note that the marginal rates of substitution (assuming these are well-
defined) of the individuals are equal if all bundles are on the same ray through the
9
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Figure 2. The efficiency level of distribution X is d(X) = s1 + s2
To provide a formula for e, we use that e = f/d. Substituting equations
(2) and (3) and using that u(µX) =W (Xµ) for each social welfare function
W in W, we obtain
e(X) =
W (X)
1
n
∑n
i=1 u(xi)
. (4)
Equation (4) is the equally distributed equivalent well-being level divided
by the average well-being level, so that the inequity measure 1 − e coin-
cides with Sen’s (1973, p. 42, equation (2.17)) general normative relative
unidimensional inequality measure applied to the vector of well-being lev-
els. Hence, the inequity measure 1 − e is what Weymark (2006) refers
to as a two-stage inequality measure. Indeed, in the two-stage approach,
which was proposed by Maasoumi (1986), the individual well-being levels
are computed in the first stage and a unidimensional inequality measure is
applied to the vector of these levels in the second stage.15 The two-stage
approach has been interpreted in the literature as being inherently distinct
from the normative approach as well as theoretically less appealing (see
the discussions by Bourguignon, 1999, and Weymark, 2006). Hence, it
origin.
14Inequity aversion is defined here completely in analogy with risk aversion in the
case of many commodities (Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1974). The fact that the mean of
least concave representations can be interpreted as the risk neutral, or inequity neutral,
case is discussed by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1981).
15Maasoumi (1986) proposed to apply the generalized entropy class of unidimensional
inequality measures to the vector of levels of a ces individual well-being measure. The
generalized entropy class includes a subclass that is ordinally equivalent to the Atkinson
(1970) class of normative unidimensional inequality measures.
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is striking that the two-stage approach turns out to deliver the inequity
component of the normative inequality measure 1− f .
Note that the inefficiency measure and the inequity measure have a
straightforward graphical interpretation in terms of Figure 2. The ineffi-
ciency measure summarizes the distance from the actual bundles to the
constructed efficient bundles on the dashed line. The inequity measure
measures the inequality between these constructed efficient bundles on the
dashed line.16
3.3 The double-ces class
We end this section with an application of the decomposition to the class
of double-ces social welfare functions, a popular subclass of W of which
the members satisfy additive separability and replication invariance.17 The
double-ces class is used in the empirical illustration of Section 5.
A double-ces social welfare function uses a ces function to aggregate
at the social level and a second ces function to aggregate at the individual
level. A social welfare function W is a member of the double-ces class if,
for each distribution X in D, we have
W (X) =


(
1
n
n∑
i=1
u(xi)
1−α
) 1
1−α
for α ≥ 0 and α 6= 1,
n∏
i=1
u(xi)
1
n for α = 1,
(5)
and
u(xi) =


(
m∑
k=1
rkx
1−β
ik
) 1
1−β
for β ≥ 0 and β 6= 1,
m∏
k=1
xrkik for β = 1,
(6)
where rk > 0 for each good k and r1 + r2 + · · · + rm = 1. The shape of
the iso-well-being curves is determined by the weights rk on the different
dimensions and by the parameter β. The parameter β determines the
16Because 1−e is a relative two-stage measure, it is simply a unidimensional measure
applied to the si shares.
17For axiomatic characterizations of the double-ces class (or subclasses thereof), see
Decancq and Ooghe (2010), Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2011), Seth (2011) and Tsui
(1995). For discussions of the class, see Atkinson (2003) and Bourguignon (1999).
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degree of complementarity, with β = 0 corresponding to the case of perfect
substitutes and β →∞ to the case of perfect complements. The parameter
α determines the degree of inequity aversion. The case α = 0 corresponds
to inequity neutrality with social welfare equal to the mean of least concave
representations, and the case α→∞ corresponds to maximin with welfare
measured by the well-being level of the individual in the worst position.
We apply equations (2), (3) and (4) to the double-ces class (we omit
the cases α = 1 and β = 1). We have
f(X) =

 1
n
n∑
i=1
(∑m
k=1 rkx
1−β
ik∑m
k=1 rkµ
1−β
k
) 1−α
1−β


1
1−α
, (7)
d(X) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(∑m
k=1 rkx
1−β
ik∑m
k=1 rkµ
1−β
k
) 1
1−β
, (8)
and
e(X) =
(
1
n
∑n
i=1(
∑m
k=1 rkx
1−β
ik )
1−α
1−β
) 1
1−α
1
n
∑n
i=1
(∑m
k=1 rkx
1−β
ik
) 1
1−β
. (9)
The parameters α and β of the double-ces class play different roles for
the inefficiency and inequity components.18 First, the interpretation of α
as a parameter of inequity aversion is clear: efficiency d is not influenced by
α, while inequity 1−e increases if inequity aversion α increases. Hence, also
the relative importance of the inequity component increases with inequity
aversion. Inequality 1− f is a pure measure of inefficiency if α = 0, i.e., in
that case 1−f = 1−d. Second, as the parameter β increases, the different
dimensions become less substitutable and efficiency d lowers. Typically,
also the value of e will change as β varies. The reason is that 1− e is equal
to the unidimensional Atkinson (1970) inequality measure applied to the
vector of well-being levels, and these well-being levels typically change if
β changes. Inequality 1 − f reduces to a pure measure of inequity only
if the goods are perfect substitutes, i.e., if β = 0. In this case we have
1− f = 1− e.19
18The values of the weights rk for the different goods have a complex impact on both
d and e.
19For a characterization of a multidimensional social welfare function with a linear
individual well-being function, see Bosmans, Lauwers and Ooghe (2009).
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4 How do transfers affect equity and efficiency?
Multidimensional transfer principles endow the social welfare function with
a concern for equality. They therefore play a key role in the normative ap-
proach to inequality measurement. Two prominent transfer principles are
uniform majorization (Kolm, 1977, Tsui, 1995) and correlation increasing
majorization (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982, Tsui, 1999). Although
these two principles are widely used in the literature, both have received
considerable criticism. Uniform majorization has been shown to recom-
mend in some cases transfers that are unambiguously unfavorable in terms
of equity (Dardanoni, 1995). Correlation increasing majorization has been
claimed to be inappropriate if the goods are complements (Bourguignon
and Chakravarty, 2003). We will disentangle the efficiency and equity ef-
fects of the transfers propagated by each of the two principles and thus
provide new insights into these two critiques.
First, we consider uniform majorization, which advocates progressive
transfers in each dimension with a uniform structure across dimensions.
The principle is a strict version of the weak uniform majorization principle
defined in Section 2.
Uniform majorization. For all distributions X and Y in D such that X 6=
Y , if X = QY with Q a bistochastic matrix that is not a permutation
matrix, then W (X) > W (Y ).
Uniform majorization is satified by a social welfare function in W if u
is strictly concave and v is strictly Schur-concave.
Dardanoni (1995) provides an example in which uniform majorization
recommends transfers that actually widen the gaps between individual
well-being levels. He argues that this puts into question the appropri-
ateness of uniform majorization in the context of inequality measurement.
Figure 3 presents an example qualitatively similar to Dardanoni’s. The
figure extends the example in the left-hand panel of Figure 1 by adding in
distributions X and Y a third individual with bundle x3 = y3 = (10, 10).
20
Equity clearly worsens in going from X to Y because the gap between
the equally well off individuals 1 and 2, on the one hand, and the worst
off individual 3, on the other hand, further widens. Nevertheless, uniform
majorization demands that equality increases as we move from X to Y ,
i.e., f(X) < f(Y ).21 Our decomposition helps to understand this coun-
20The iso-well-being curves in the figure are for the symmetric Cobb-Douglas case.
This is not essential: examples with the same conclusion can easily be constructed if u
is not in the Cobb-Douglas form or is not symmetric.
21Because Y = QX and X 6= Y with Q = ((0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0.5, 0), (0, 0, 1)), we have
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Figure 3. Uniform majorization implies W (X) < W (Y )
terintuitive implication. It is straightforward to show that, for all social
welfare functions in W satisfying uniform majorization, the move from X
to Y is a worsening in terms of equity, but an improvement in terms of effi-
ciency, i.e., we have e(X) > e(Y ) and d(X) < d(Y ) = 1. That is, uniform
majorization imposes that the efficiency improvement in going from X to
Y should outweigh the equity worsening, so that equality as measured by
f goes up.22
The conclusion that the transfers recommended by uniform majoriza-
tion increase efficiency extends beyond the above example. It holds in
general: if u is strictly concave, then we have d(QX) > d(X) for each
distribution X in D and each non-permutation bistochastic matrix Q such
that X 6= QX .23 In terms of Figure 2, the intuition is that multiplication
by a bistochastic matrix brings the bundles closer to the dashed line. To
sum up, the effect on efficiency is positive in general, while, as the above
example shows, the effect on equity is not always positive. We can con-
W (X) < W (Y ). Since, in addition, W (Xµ) = W (Yµ), we obtain f(X) < f(Y ) using
equation (2).
22Dardanoni (1995) uses a two-stage inequality measure to argue that ‘inequality’
increases in this example. Weymark (2006) argues that Dardanoni’s example shows that
it is the two-stage approach that is problematical, rather than the uniform majorization
principle. But, we saw in the previous section that the inequity measure in the normative
approach is a two-stage inequality measure. Hence, if we interpret Dardanoni’s critique
as arguing that uniform majorization is not a satisfactory principle of equity, then his
critique remains valid also within the normative approach.
23Let Y = QX . We have
∑n
i=1 u(xi)/n <
∑n
i=1 u(yi)/n (Kolm, 1977, Theorem 3),
while u(µX) = u(µY ). Using equation (3), we obtain d(QX) > d(X).
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clude, therefore, that uniform majorization is more successful at capturing
the efficiency aspect of multidimensional inequality than at capturing the
equity aspect.24
Next, we discuss correlation increasing majorization, which advocates
exchanges of goods that decrease the correlation between dimensions. Let
X and Y be distributions in D that coincide except for individuals i and
j, let xi 6= xj, and let yi be the componentwise minimum and yj the
componentwise maximum of xi and xj .
25 Then, Y is said to be obtained
from X by a correlation increasing switch.
Correlation increasing majorization. For all distributions X and Y in D,
if Y is obtained from X by a correlation increasing switch, then W (X) >
W (Y ).
Figure 4 gives an example where distribution X = (x1, x2) with x1 =
(70, 10) and x1 = (10, 70) and distribution Y = (y1, y2) with y1 = (70, 70)
and y2 = (10, 10). Conditions on u and v for a social welfare function in
W that ensure satisfaction of correlation increasing majorization have not
been established in the literature. For a member of the double-ces class,
the requirement is α > β.
Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003, pp. 35-36) claim that correlation
increasing majorization is inappropriate if the goods are complements. We
use our decomposition to examine this claim. To define complementarity
we rely on the Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth-Pareto (alep) notion as refined
by Kannai (1980): goods are complements if u is strictly supermodular.26
24It is by now fair to say that the uniform majorization principle is controversial as a
principle of equity. Trannoy (2006) and Fleurbaey (2006) argue that it is inappropriate
that the principle imposes quasi-concavity on individual well-being functions. Duclos,
Sahn and Younger (2011) show that an example where the principle recommends trans-
fers that reduce equity can also be found in the two-individual case if the assumption
of homothetic individual well-being rankings is dropped.
25That is, yi = (min{xik, xjk})k=1,...,m and yj = (max{xik, xjk})k=1,...,m.
26A function u is supermodular if u(x ∨ y) + u(x ∧ y) ≥ u(x) + u(y) for all x and
y in B, where x ∨ y is the componentwise maximum and x ∧ y is the componentwise
minimum of x and y. If, in addition, the inequality holds strictly for all unordered
pairs x and y, then u is strictly supermodular. For a twice-differentiable u, supermod-
ularity is equivalent to non-negative cross-derivatives. According to the alep notion,
complementarity is equivalent to strict supermodularity of some functional representa-
tion of the well-being ranking. The refinement of Kannai (1980) consists in applying
the alep notion to the specific least concave representation of the well-being ranking
and thus removes all arbitrariness concerning the choice of the representation. Unfortu-
nately, Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) rely on the original alep definition, which
renders their treatment of complements versus substitutes unsatisfactory. We refer to
Atkinson (2003, pp. 57-60) for a thorough treatment of this point.
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Figure 4. Correlation increasing majorization implies W (X) > W (Y )
A general conclusion can be drawn about the effect of a correlation in-
creasing switch on efficiency: if u is strictly supermodular, then we have
d(X) < d(Y ) for all distributions X and Y in D such that Y is obtained
from X by a correlation increasing switch.27 In other words, the transfers
advocated by correlation increasing majorization always worsen efficiency
in the case of complements. In terms of Figure 2, the intuition is roughly
that these transfers move the bundles away from the dashed line. But the
transfers also unambiguously reduce the well-being gap between the two
individuals involved, irrespective of whether the goods are complements
or substitutes. Summing up, correlation increasing majorization demands
we accept an efficiency leak in a transfer from a better off individual to a
worse off individual. Hence, it does not follow that correlation increasing
majorization is a priori inappropriate if the goods are complements: the
principle just becomes more demanding, i.e., imposes a greater tolerance
of efficiency leaks, as the degree of complementary increases.
We consider the distributions X and Y in Figure 4 to make the above
point more concrete. For a strictly supermodular u, we indeed have d(X) <
d(Y ) = 1, while the gap between the well-being levels of individuals 1 and
2 has widened in going from X to Y . The efficiency loss that has to be
tolerated in return for the reduction in the well-being gap can be made pre-
cise by considering the well-being vectors corresponding to distributions X
27Let Y be obtained from X by a correlation increasing switch. We have∑n
i=1 u(xi)/n <
∑n
i=1 u(yi)/n by supermodularity of u, while u(µX) = u(µY ). Us-
ing equation (3), we obtain d(X) < d(Y ).
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and Y . In Figure 4 we have β = 1 and hence u is strictly supermodu-
lar. We have (u(x1), u(x2)) = (27, 27) and (u(y1), u(y2)) = (70, 10). The
efficiency loss in moving from Y to X translates in terms of well-being as
a leaky-bucket transfer: individual 1 gave up 43 units, but individual 2
received only 17. The leak that the principle asks us to tolerate increases
as the degree of complementarity β increases. For example, this leak is
zero units if the goods are substitutes (β = 0), it is 12 units if β = 0.5,
it is 26 units if β = 1 as we saw above, and it approaches the full 60 unit
well-being difference between individuals 1 and 2 as β → ∞. This also
helps to understand the requirement α > β for a double-ces social welfare
function: as the degree of complementarity β increases, the efficiency leak
becomes larger, and hence the tolerance of leaks has to increase accordingly
by increasing inequity aversion α.
The analysis of this section shows that neither uniform majorization
nor correlation increasing majorization captures the simplicity of the uni-
dimensional Pigou-Dalton principle. The Pigou-Dalton principle expresses
a clear and elementary idea: an improvement in equity (in the unidimen-
sional case, a progressive transfer), while keeping efficiency at the same
level (which in the unidimensional case amounts to preserving the mean),
increases welfare. On the other hand, we have seen that the two multidi-
mensional principles have implications in cases where equity and efficiency
change simultaneously. In the case of uniform majorization the recommen-
dation sometimes even is unequivocally in the direction of worse equity. We
conclude that it would be interesting to examine a new multidimensional
transfer principle that, like the unidimensional Pigou-Dalton principle, rec-
ommends transfers that improve equity e but preserve efficiency d. We
leave this issue to future research.28
28For a social welfare function in W , such efficiency-preserving transfers would boil
down to simple progressive transfers in the individual well-being vector, i.e., transfers
that preserve
∑n
i=1 u(xi) (and µ(X)): see equation (3). Hence, such a transfer principle
is trivially satisfied for each social welfare function in W with a strictly Schur-concave
v. But there is a circular idea here because the social welfare functions in W already
satisfy weak uniform majorization, a property we may no longer want once we impose
the new transfer principle. Moreover, weak uniform majorization was used to obtain the
formula for efficiency in equation (3) in the first place. Bosmans, Decancq and Ooghe
(2013) study an efficiency-preserving transfer principle in the more general context of
heterogenous individual well-being rankings.
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5 Empirical illustration
We illustrate the proposed decomposition with an empirical application
to population-weighted between-country inequality in the period 1980 to
2011. Each individual in a country is assigned the same bundle of goods,
the average bundle of his country. Following the well-known Human De-
velopment Index (hdi), we consider the following three ‘goods’: living
standards, health and education.29 We only retain the countries for which
the data are available in both 1980 and 2011, leaving us with 105 countries
covering 84% of the population in 2011. Appendix C lists the countries.
We measure inequality and its inefficiency and inequity components using
the double-ces class in equations (7), (8) and (9). Throughout, we use
equal weights for the three goods, i.e., r1 = r2 = r3 = 1/3, but we consider
a variety of values of α and β.
The hdi aggregates the goods in a way that is consistent with our
analysis. It uses the ces well-being function in equation (3) with equal
weighting of the three goods and with β equal to 0 prior to 2010 and β
equal to 1 since. By consequence, the inequity component in our analysis
is the unidimensional Atkinson inequality measure applied to the hdi well-
being measure (for β equal to 0 or 1) or to similar well-being measures
(for other values of β).30 The recent change in the value of β in the
definition of the hdi is interesting, as it constitutes a move away from
perfect substitutability (β = 0) to a case of complementarity (β = 1), and
hence introduces the efficiency aspect. In the current context, efficiency
captures, using the words of the undp (2010, p. 15), “how well rounded a
country’s performance is across the three dimensions.”
Figure 5 presents an overview of the data. The two left-hand panels
are for 1980, the two right-hand panels for 2011. The two top panels show
each country’s achievements in living standards and health, the two bot-
tom panels show achievements in living standards and education. Larger
29We define the three goods as in the hdi-methodology of the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (undp). Living standards are measured using the logarithm of
gni per capita (in 2005 us$ ppp), health is measured by life expectancy at birth, and
education by a geometric average of normalized mean years of schooling and normalized
expected years of schooling. Each dimension is normalized between 0 and 1. See undp
(2010, pp. 216-217) for details. The data have been downloaded from the undp website
in December 2012. Note that the use of a logarithmic transformation in the definition
of living standards is controversial. See Decancq, Decoster and Schokkaert (2009) and
Ravallion (2012) for critical discussions.
30Noorbakhsh (2007) applies the unidimensional Gini index to the hdi values, clearly
a two-stage approach. Decancq, Decoster and Schokkaert (2009) contrast the normative
and two-stage approaches in the context of global well-being inequality.
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Figure 5. Living standards and health (top) and living standards and
education (bottom) in 1980 (left) and 2011 (right)
points correspond to more highly populated countries. The dashed line
in each panel, which connects the origin with the average bundle, has the
same interpretation as the dashed line in Figure 2. Efficiency appears to
have improved between 1980 and 2011, as points have moved closer to
the dashed line. Equity also seems to have improved, as highly populated
countries that traditionally were poorer, such as China and India, have
moved upward along the dashed line.
Let us first consider the results for a specific choice of the parameters.
We let β = 1, as in the new formulation of the hdi, and α = 0.5, reflecting
a moderate degree of inequity aversion. Figure 6 shows the evolution of
inequality, inefficiency and inequity for these parameter values.31 There is
31The decomposition presented in the figure is approximately additive. Recall that
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Figure 6. Inequality, inequity and inefficiency between 1980 and 2011 (α = 0.5,
β = 1)
a clear decrease of inequality, with the loss in social welfare dropping from
4.8% in 1980 to 1.6% in 2011. Note that a value of 1.6% is only seemingly
low because of the way the three goods are constructed. In absolute terms
this percentage corresponds to a considerable welfare waste: for a country
with the average bundle in 2011, it is equivalent to a loss of $1,335 out
of $7,922 (keeping the health and education levels fixed). The decreasing
trends for the inefficiency and inequity components are in line with the
first impression from Figure 5. Note that, for the chosen values of α and
β, inefficiency falls at a considerably faster rate than inequity.
Table 1 presents results for a variety of combinations of the parame-
ters α and β for the years 1980 and 2011. For all considered values of
the parameters, inequality, inefficiency and inequity decrease. The relative
the decomposition is multiplicative, i.e., f(X) = d(X) × e(X). Hence, the logarithm
can be decomposed additively, i.e., ln f(X) = ln d(X)+ ln e(X). For values of t close to
1, we indeed have ln t ≈ 1− t, so that 1− f(X) ≈ 1− d(X) + 1− e(X).
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Table 1. Inequality, inefficiency and inequity in 1980 and 2011
1980 2011
α β Inequality Inefficiency Inequity Inequality Inefficiency Inequity
0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.5 1.03 1.03 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.00
1 2.09 2.09 0.00 0.42 0.42 0.00
2 4.02 4.02 0.00 0.80 0.80 0.00
5 7.26 7.26 0.00 1.59 1.59 0.00
0.5 0 2.22 0.00 2.22 1.08 0.00 1.08
0.5 3.50 1.03 2.49 1.34 0.21 1.14
1 4.81 2.09 2.78 1.61 0.42 1.20
2 7.28 4.02 3.40 2.12 0.80 1.33
5 11.66 7.26 4.74 3.20 1.59 1.63
1 0 4.34 0.00 4.34 2.18 0.00 2.18
0.5 5.83 1.03 4.84 2.51 0.21 2.30
1 7.38 2.09 5.40 2.84 0.42 2.44
2 10.35 4.02 6.60 3.50 0.80 2.71
5 15.76 7.26 9.16 4.92 1.59 3.38
2 0 8.21 0.00 8.21 4.48 0.00 4.48
0.5 10.05 1.03 9.11 4.96 0.21 4.76
1 12.00 2.09 10.12 5.46 0.42 5.06
2 15.85 4.02 12.32 6.47 0.80 5.71
5 23.04 7.26 17.01 8.86 1.59 7.39
5 0 17.31 0.00 17.31 12.48 0.00 12.48
0.5 19.82 1.03 18.98 13.65 0.21 13.47
1 22.78 2.09 21.13 15.01 0.42 14.65
2 30.10 4.02 27.18 18.24 0.80 17.58
5 45.23 7.26 40.94 27.32 1.59 26.15
drop in efficiency is more pronounced than the relative drop in inequity
across different parameter values (except of course for β = 0, in which case
efficiency is zero). As β increases, the relative decrease in inefficiency is
stronger. As α increases, the share of inequity in inequality increases, a
consequence of the fact that increasing α increases inequity, while leav-
ing inefficiency unaffected. The relative decrease in inequity falls as α
increases. While cases where inequality and inequity move in opposite di-
rections do not occur in the table, such cases do occur in the data. For
example, given β = 0.33 and a high degree of inequality aversion α = 10,
inequality falls between 1980 and 2005, while inequity rises. This serves
as an illustration that one should be cautious in identifying inequity and
inequality in empirical research.
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6 Conclusion
Normative indices of multidimensional inequality capture both the inequity
and inefficiency exhibited by a distribution. Using a suggestion by Graaff
(1977), we have provided a decomposition of normative inequality into its
inequity and inefficiency parts for a generic class of social welfare functions.
Our analysis has revealed an intimate link between the normative ap-
proach and the two-stage approach. This is striking, as the literature
regards these two approaches as inherently different. While the two-stage
approach in its original conception by Maasoumi (1986) does not rest on
axiomatic foundations, we have shown that it nevertheless has a solid jus-
tification within the axiomatic normative approach. A plausible view on
inequality measurement may be that it should not be concerned with in-
efficiency at all, making the measurement of inequity the only objective.
If this view is taken, then, as our analysis has shown, two-stage inequality
measures are the appropriate measures to use.
The decomposition has also yielded new insights into the two main
multidimensional transfer principles, viz., uniform majorization and corre-
lation increasing majorization. These principles propagate transfers that
have both equity and efficiency effects, making the overall implication of
these transfers difficult to evaluate a priori. In particular, if again the view
is taken that the objective is to measure inequity and not inefficiency, then
uniform majorization is a clearly unappealing requirement, as it in some
cases recommends transfers that unambiguously increase inequity, an in-
tuition already apparent in Dardanoni (1995). We believe that the basic
issue of how to satisfactorily generalize the simple unidimensional Pigou-
Dalton principle to the multidimensional setting remains unsettled. We
leave the issue to further research.
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Appendix A
We provide a characterization of the class of social welfare functions W.
First, we formally define the seven properties presented in Section 2. We
write X > Y if xij ≥ yij for all individuals i and all goods k with at least
one inequality holding strictly. We use 1n×m to denote the n ×m matrix
with a one at each entry.
(i) Anonymity. For all distributions X and Y in D, if X and Y are
equal up to a rearrangement of rows, then W (X) =W (Y ).
(ii) Monotonicity. For all distributions X and Y in D, if X > Y , then
W (X) > W (Y ).
(iii) Continuity. The function W is continuous.
(iv) Weak uniform majorization. For all distributions X and Y in D, if
X = QY with Q a bistochastic matrix that is not a permutation
matrix, then W (X) ≥W (Y ).
(v) Normalization. For each real number λ, we have W (λ1n×m) = λ.
(vi) Individualism. There exist a function Ui : B → R for each individual
i and a function V : Rn → R such that, for each distribution X in
D, we have W (X) = V (U1(x1), U2(x2), . . . , Un(xn)).
(vii) Homotheticity. For all distributions X and Y in D and each positive
real number λ, we have W (X) ≥ W (Y ) if and only if W (λX) ≥
W (λY ).
We now prove the following result.
A social welfare function W satisfies properties (i) to (vii) if and only if
there exists a continuous, concave, linearly homogenous and strictly in-
creasing function u : B → R with u(1m) = 1 and a continuous, Schur-
concave, linearly homogenous and strictly increasing function v : Rn → R
with v(1n) = 1 such that, for each distribution X in D, we have W (X) =
v(u(x1), u(x2), . . . , u(xn)).
Proof. Let W be a social welfare function that satisfies properties (i) to
(vii). By anonymity, monotonicity, continuity and individualism, there
exist a continuous and strictly increasing function uˆ : B → R and a con-
tinuous and strictly increasing function vˆ : Rn → R such that, for each
distribution X in D, we have W (X) = vˆ(uˆ(x1), uˆ(x2), . . . , uˆ(xn)).
Homotheticity implies that, for all bundles x and y in B and each
positive real number λ, we haveW ((x, x, . . . , x)′) ≥W ((y, y, . . . , y)′) if and
only if W ((λx, λx, . . . , λx)′) ≥W ((λy, λy, . . . , λy)′). It follows that, for all
bundles x and y in B and each positive real number λ, we have uˆ(x) ≥ uˆ(y)
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if and only if uˆ(λx) ≥ uˆ(λy), i.e., uˆ is a homothetic function. Hence, there
exists a linearly homogenous function u : Rn → R with u(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1
and a strictly increasing function ψ : R → R such that uˆ = ψ ◦ u. Let
the function v : Rn → R be such that, for each (s1, s2, . . . , sn) in R
n, we
have vˆ(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = v(ψ
−1(s1), ψ
−1(s2), . . . , ψ
−1(sn)). It follows that,
for each distribution X in D, we have W (X) = v(u(x1), u(x2), . . . , u(xn)).
The functions u and v inherit continuity and strict increasingness from the
functions uˆ and vˆ. Furthermore, by normalization, v is linearly homogenous
and v(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1. What remains to be shown is that u is concave and
that v is Schur-concave.
We first show that u is quasi-concave. Seeking a contradiction, suppose
that u is not quasi-concave. Then there exists a bundle x in B such that
the upper contour set {y ∈ B|u(y) ≥ u(x)} is not convex. This implies that
there exist two bundles a and b in B such that u(0.5a+0.5b) < u(a) = u(b).
Let T be an n× n matrix, where each row k 6= i, j has 1 at the kth entry
and 0 at each other entry, and where rows i and j have 0.5 at the ith
entry, 0.5 at the jth entry and 0 at each other entry. Let X be a distri-
bution in D with bundle a at the ith row and bundle b at the jth row.
Distribution TX has bundle 0.5a+ 0.5b at both the ith and the jth rows
and coincides with X on all other rows. Since u(0.5a + 0.5b) < u(a) =
u(b), we have W (X) > W (TX). But weak uniform majorization implies
W (X) ≥ W (TX) because T is a bistochastic matrix that is not a permu-
tation matrix. We have a contradiction and hence u is quasi-concave. We
know from Kihlstrom and Mirman (1981) that u is a least concave repre-
sentation since it is is linearly homogenous in addition to being continuous,
strictly increasing and quasi-concave. Hence, u is concave.
Next we show that v is Schur-concave. Let x(t) denote the bundle
(t, t, . . . , t) in B. Jointly, anonymity and weak uniform majorization imply
that, for each (t1, t2, . . . , tn) in R
n and each bistochastic matrix Q, we
have W ((x(t1), x(t2), . . . , x(tn))
′) ≤ W (Q(x(t1), x(t2), . . . , x(tn))
′). Using
that u is linearly homogenous function and u(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1, it follows
that, for each (t1, t2, . . . , tn) in R
n and each bistochastic matrix Q, we have
v((t1, t2, . . . , tn)
′) ≤ v(Q(t1, t2, . . . , tn)
′). Hence, v is Schur-concave.
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Appendix B
We provide a concise treatment of the analysis of Section 3 for the absolute
case. We omit all explanations that are similar to those in Section 3. The
only change we make to the basic assumptions in Section 2 is that good
amounts can be zero or negative in addition to positive.
We focus on the class of social welfare functions W∗. A social welfare
function W is in W∗ if and only if there exist a continuous, concave, unit
translatable32 and strictly increasing function u : B → R with u(1m) = 1
and a continuous, Schur-concave, unit translatable and strictly increasing
function v : Rn → R with v(1n) = 1 such that, for each distribution X in
D, we have W (X) = v(u(x1), u(x2), . . . , u(xn)).
The class W∗ is characterized by the combination of properties (i) to
(vi) in Appendix A and the following property of translatability (we omit
the proof).
Translatability. For all distributions X and Y in D and each positive
real number λ, we have W (X) ≥ W (Y ) if and only if W (X + λ1n×m) ≥
W (Y + λ1n×m).
The definitions of inequality and the inefficiency and inequity compo-
nents for the absolute case are as follows.
Definition 1∗. Let X be a distribution in D. Let f ∗(X) be the largest real
number for which there exists a distribution Y in D such that W (Y ) =
W (X) and µY = µX − f
∗(X)1n. Then, f
∗(X) is the inequality level of
distribution X .
Definition 2∗. Let X be a distribution in D. Let d∗(X) be the largest
real number for which there exists a distribution Z in D such that u(zi) =
u(xi) for each individual i and µZ = µX − d
∗(X)1n. Then, d
∗(X) is the
inefficiency level of distribution X .
Definition 3∗. Let X be a distribution in D. Let Z be a distribution
in D obtained from distribution X as in Definition 2∗. Let e(X) be
the largest real number for which there exists a distribution T such that
W (T ) = W (Z) and µT = µZ − e
∗(X)1n. Then, e
∗(X) is the inequity level
of distribution X .
We obtain an additive decomposition of inequality into inefficiency and
inequity parts. That is, for each distribution X in D, we have
f ∗(X) = d∗(X) + e∗(X).
32A function ψ : Rℓ → R is unit translatable if ψ(s + λ1ℓ) = λ + ψ(s) for each s in
R
ℓ and each real number λ.
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For a distribution X in D, inequality f ∗(X) is defined by W (X) =
W (Xµ − f
∗(X)1n×m). Using unit translatability of W , we obtain
f ∗(X) = W (Xµ)−W (X).
For each individual i, define ti by u(xi) = u(µX − ti). The efficient
distribution Z equals (µX−t1, µX−t2, . . . , µX−tn)
′. Since
∑n
i=1 µX − ti =
nµZ , we have d
∗(X) =
∑n
i=1 ti/n. Moreover, ti = u(µX)− u(xi) because u
is unit translatable. We obtain
d∗(X) = u(µX)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
u(xi).
Finally, using e∗ = f ∗ − d∗ and u(µX) = W (Xµ), we obtain
e∗(X) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
u(xi)− w(X).
28
Appendix C
Table 2. Countries in the data set
Afghanistan Germany Nicaragua
Algeria Ghana Niger
Argentina Greece Norway
Australia Guatemala Pakistan
Austria Guyana Panama´
Bahrain Haiti Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh Honduras Paraguay
Belgium Hong Kong Peru
Belize Hungary Philippines
Benin Iceland Portugal
Bolivia India Qatar
Botswana Indonesia Republic of Korea
Brazil Iran Rwanda
Brunei Darussalam Ireland Saudi Arabia
Burundi Israel Senegal
Cameroon Italy Sierra Leone
Canada Jamaica South Africa
Central African Republic Japan Spain
Chile Jordan Sri Lanka
China Kenya Sudan
Colombia Kuwait Sweden
Congo Lesotho Switzerland
Costa Rica Luxembourg Syria
Coˆte d’Ivoire Malawi Thailand
Democratic Republic of the Congo Malaysia Togo
Denmark Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Malta Tunisia
Ecuador Mauritania Turkey
Egypt Mauritius United Arab Emirates
El Salvador Mexico United Kingdom
Fiji Morocco United States
Finland Myanmar Uruguay
France Nepal Venezuela
Gabon Netherlands Zambia
Gambia New Zealand Zimbabwe
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